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Stochastic Coupon Probing in Social Networks
Shaojie Tang
University of Texas at Dallas
ABSTRACT
In this paper,we study stochastic couponprobing problem in social
networks. Assume there is a social network and a set of coupons.
We can offer coupons to some users adaptively and those users
who accept the offer will act as seeds and influence their friends
in the social network. There are two constraints which are called
the inner and outer constraints, respectively. The set of coupons
redeemed by users must satisfy inner constraints, and the set of all
probed users must satisfy outer constraints. One seeks to develop a
coupon probing policy that achieves themaximum influence while
satisfying both inner and outer constraints. Our main result is a
constant approximation policy for the stochastic coupon probing
problem for any monotone submodular utility function.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social media marketing has been recognized as one of the most
effective marketing methods which can increase marketers’ busi-
ness’ visibility with little cost. As reported in Social Media Exam-
iner, around 96% of marketers are currently participating in social
mediamarketing. Different from traditional onlinemarketing strat-
egy whose focus is to find the best match between a given product
and an individual customer, social media marketing is more con-
cerned about the network value of a customer. For example, giving
some influential customers an incentive (such as coupon as studied
in this work) to share your product information with their social
circle could increase your brand recognition rapidly as they are
engaging with a broad audience of customers.
To this end, we introduce and study the stochastic coupon prob-
ing problem in social networks. Assume there is a social network
and a set of coupons. We can offer coupons to some users and
those users who accept the offer will act as seed nodes and influence
their friends in the social network. However, any feasible solution
must satisfy two constraints which are called the inner and outer
constraints, respectively. The set of coupons redeemed by users
must satisfy inner constraints, and the set of all probed users must
satisfy outer constraints. In particular, we consider the following
constraints in our basic model: (Outer Constraint) The number of
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probes involving the same user can not exceed a non-negative con-
stant, and (Inner Constraint) the total value of redeemed coupons
can not exceed a non-negative number. Our ultimate goal is to de-
velop a coupon probing policy that achieves the maximum influ-
ence subject to both inner and outer constraints.
We notice that most of existing studies on coupon allocation
assume a “budgeted and non-adaptive ” setting [14], where there
is a predefined budget for selecting seed nodes, their solution is
to commit the set of initial users and corresponding coupons all
at once in advance. Our model is largely different from all exist-
ing work. We consider a stochastic optimization problem: Rather
than make a one-shot decision at the very beginning, we can probe
users one by one using some carefully selected coupons, and the
decision made at each round is depending on the realization from
previously probed users. In particular, if a user accepts our coupon,
then we add that user to the solution and deduct corresponding
coupon value from our budget, otherwise, the budget remains the
same. Since the remaining budget after each round depends on the
realization from earlier rounds, our decision made in each round
is also dependent on the choices in earlier rounds.
Based on the above discussion, our problem falls belong to the
category of stochastic optimization. Although there has been ex-
tensive work on adaptive/stochatic submodular optimization [7][2][1],
our stochastic couponprobingmodel is substantially different from
these problems: first of all, existing studies mainly assume that the
cost of the action is fixed and pre-known, however, this assumption
is clearly not true under our model, i.e, the actual cost of offering
some coupon to a user depends on whether or not she accepts the
offer; secondly, actions may incur non-uniform cost in our model,
i.e., coupons have different values; thirdly, the realization of dif-
ferent actions are not independent, i.e., any rational user will not
accept a low value coupon while rejecting a high value coupon;
lastly, our model involves a broader set of constraints including
outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack constraint. Unfortu-
nately, none of the existing solutions in the literature explicitly
take the above three constraints into account.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically
study the stochastic coupon probing problem in social networks.
We present a novel probing policy that achieves a constant approx-
imation ratio. This research contributes fundamentally to the de-
velopment of approximate probing policies for any problems that
fall into the family of stochastic optimization problems with cor-
related realizations subject to outer matroid constraint and inner
knapsack constraint.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We review related
work in Section 2 and introduce our problem formulation in Sec-
tion 3.1. We develop a novel coupon probing policy in Section 4.
In Section 5, we extend the basic model to incorporate more con-
straints. We conclude this paper in Section 6. Some important no-
tations are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Symbol table.
Notation Meaning
C the ground set that contains all coupons
Cl a list of all low-value coupons
I (U) the expected cascade ofU
y a decision matrix
f +(y) the concave extension of f
pv,c the attractiveness of c to v
(v, c) an action that offers c to v
(v,ψ ) an action that offers ψ to v sequentially
ϕ((v, c)) the realization of action (v, c)
bvψ the expected cost of action (v,ψ )
Ψ subsequences from Cl with size at most K
S , V × Ψ the action space under P.B
2 RELATED WORK
This work is closely related to two topics: influence maximization
(IM) and stochastic submodular optimization. IM has been exten-
sively studied in the literature [4–6, 8, 9], their objective is to find
a set of influential customers so as to maximize the expected cas-
cade. However, our work differ from all existing studies in several
major aspects. Traditional IM assumes any node is guaranteed to
be activated once it is selected, we relax this assumption by allow-
ing users to response differently to different coupon values. Re-
cently, [14][15] study discount allocation problem in social net-
works. However, [14] assumes a budgeted and non-adaptive set-
ting where decisions must be made all at once in advance, while
[15] simply ignores the outer constraint, e.g., their model allows
the company to probe all users at zero cost, we formulate our prob-
lem as a stochastic optimization problem subject to both inner and
other constraints.
Another closely related topic to ours is adaptive/stochatic sub-
modular optimization [7][10][2][1]. Existing approaches can not
apply directly to our setting due to the following reasons: (1) the
actual cost of offering some coupon to a user is stochastic rather
than a fixed value, (2) coupons have different values, (3) the realiza-
tion of different actions are not independent, and (4) our problem
involves a broader set of constraints including outer matroid con-
straint and inner knapsack constraint. In summary, we are the first
to study the stochastic coupon probing problemwith correlated re-
alizations subject to outer matroid constraint and inner knapsack
constraint. We propose a novel probing policy that provides the
first bounded approximate solutions to this problem.
3 PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
3.1 Submodular Function and Its Concave
Extension
Consider a set function h : 2Ω → R, where 2Ω denotes the power
set of Ω. We say h is submodular if and only if it satisfies he follow
property: For every X ,Y ⊆ Ω with X ⊆ Y and every x ∈ Ω\Y , we
have that h(X ∪ {x}) − h(X ) ≥ h(Y ∪ {x}) − h(Y ).
Given any vector x = {x1, x2, . . . ,xn } such that each 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1.
The concave extension of h is defined as
h+(x) = max
{ ∑
X ⊆Ω
αX f (X )
 αX ≥ 0,
∑
X ⊆Ω αX ≤ 1;∑
X αX 1X ≤ x
}
3.2 Models
3.2.1 CouponAdoptionModel and Influence Function: Consider
a set of users V and a set of coupon values C, for every coupon
c ∈ C and every user v ∈ V , we define the attractiveness of c
to v as pv,c ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity of presentation, we directly
use c to represent the value of c . We assume that users are ra-
tional, meaning that they favor coupons with larger value, e.g.,
∀v ∈ V : pv,c ≤ pv,c ′ if c ≤ c ′.
We next describe the coupon adoption model used in this work.
At the beginning, every user v ∈ V selects a random number
σv ∈ [0, 1], which is called threshold of v . And v accepts any
coupon with attractiveness larger than or equal to σv . Once a user
accepts a coupon, she becomes a seed node of our product and
starts to influence other users in the social network. We denote
the expected influence of a set of seed nodesU as I (U), which is
a monotone and submodular function ofU, following the seminal
work on influence maximization [8]. It is easy to verify that pv,c is
equivalent to the adoption probability as defined in [14], e.g., the
probability that v accepts c is pv,c .
3.2.2 Action Space and Realizations. Weconsider an action space
H , V×C, where an action (v, c) ∈ H represents offering coupon
c ∈ C to user v ∈ V . Define ϕ((v, c)) ∈ {0, 1} to be the realization
of action (v, c) ∈ H :
ϕ((v, c)) =
{
1 if v accepts c and becomes the seed (pv,c ≥ σv )
0 if v rejectes c (pv,c < σv )
We say (v, c) is active (resp. inactive) ifϕ((v, c)) = 1 (resp.ϕ((v, c)) =
0). We can observe the realization of ϕ((v, c)) by probing v using c .
According to our coupon adoption model, each action (v, c) is ac-
tive with probability pv,c . However, the states of different actions
are not independent, e.g., if (v, c) is active, then every (v, c ′) with
c ′ ≥ c must be active (any rational user will not reject a coupon
with higher value).
3.2.3 Probing Policy. Following the framework of [7], we char-
acterize a probing policyπ as a function from realizations observed
so far toH , specifying which action to pick next based on our cur-
rent knowledge.
π : Φ →H ,
where Φ denotes the collection of realizations observed so far. By
following a particular policy, we sequentially pick an action (v, c)
and observes its state, then decides the next action to pick, and so
on. If v accepts c (ϕ((v, c)) = 1), we add v to the set of seeds and
pay c , otherwise (ϕ((v, c)) = 0), we pay nothing and move to the
next round.
Given a probing policy π , let Pr[U|π ] denote the probability
that U becomes the set of seed nodes by following π , then the
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expected utility of π can be represented as
f (π ) =
∑
U⊆V
Pr[U|π ]I (U)
3.3 Problem Formulation
We consider the setting in which we are given constraints on both
users probed and the coupons redeemed by all probed users. In
particular, the set of coupons redeemed by users must satisfy in-
ner constraint, and the set of all probed users must satisfy outer
constraint. In the basic model, we consider the following two con-
straints.
• Outer Constraints: The number of probes involving the same
user can not exceed a non-negative constant K . This con-
straint models the fact that pushing too many promotions
to the same user [11] could impede her user experience.
• Inner Constraints: The total value of redeemed coupons can
not exceed a non-negative number B.
We present the formal definition of our problem in P.A. Our ul-
timate goal is to identify the best probing policy subject to both
inner and outer constraints.
P.A maxπ f (π )
subject to: inner constraint and outer constraint;
We develop a constant approximation coupon probing policy in
Section 4. Later in Section 5, we extend the basic model to incor-
porate more constraints.
A Toy Example. For better understanding of our model, we
next go through a toy example. In this example, we assume C =
{1, 2};V = {a,b, c,d, e}; K = 1, e.g., the same user can be probed
at most once; B = 3. Consider a given probing policy π ,
In the first round, assume π (∅) = (d, 1), we offer coupon 1 to
user d , e.g., pick action (d, 1), and observe that d rejects 1. The
remaining budget is 2 and the realization is Φ1 = {ϕ(d, 1) = 0}.
In the second round, assume π (Φ1) = (a, 2), we offer 2 to a,
e.g., pick action (a, 2), and observe that a accepts 2. The remaining
budget is 1 and the realization is Φ2 = {ϕ(d, 1) = 0,ϕ(a, 2) = 1}.
In the third round, assume π (Φ2) = (b, 1), we offer 1 to b , e.g.,
pick action (b, 1), and observe that b accepts 1. The remaining bud-
get is 0 and the realization isΦ3 = {ϕ(d, 1) = 0,ϕ(a, 2) = 1,ϕ(b, 1) =
1}.
At the end,U = {a,b} is returned as the seed set and the utility
is I ({a,b}).
4 STOCHASTIC COUPON PROBING POLICY
Overview. In this paragraph, we present an overview of our al-
gorithm design. We first construct two candidate algorithms, say
ALG I and ALG II, and then randomly pick one algorithm with
equal probability as the final solution. Our approach is inspired by
the enumeration trick used to solve knapsack problem: we parti-
tion all coupons into two groups according to their values, then
apply ALG I (resp. ALG II) to find a near optimal solution us-
ing only “low-value” (resp. “high-value”) coupons. Later we show
that the better solution returned from the above two algorithms
achieves at least a constant approximation ratio.
4.1 ALG I
Before introducing the design of ALG I, we first present a restricted
version of P.A. Notice that in P.A, there is no restriction on the se-
quence of probed users and coupons, meaning that we can probe
one user first and then come back to probe that user again, using
a different coupon. To facilitate our study, we next introduce a re-
stricted version of P.A by adding one additional outer constraint:
the same user can only be probed in consecutive rounds. The re-
stricted outer constraints is presented as follows:
• Restricted Outer Constraints: (a) the number of probes in-
volving the same user can not exceed a non-negative con-
stant K ; (b) the same user can only be probed in consecutive
rounds.
We present the formal definition of the restricted problem in
P.B.
P.B maxπ f (π )
subject to: restricted outer constraints and inner constraints;
Perhaps surprisingly, later we show that restricting ourselves to
probe the same user in consecutive rounds does not sacrifice much
in terms of the utility. This enables us to focus on solving P.B in
the rest of this paper.
Since we can only probe the same user in consecutive rounds, a
valid probing policy on any individual user v can be characterized
as a sorted list of coupons ψ ⊆ C with size at most K , specifying
the sequence of coupons we offer to v sequentially. Assume we
decide to probev usingψ , the probing process that involves v can
be roughly described as follows: We follow ψ to offer a coupon
c ∈ ψ to v one by one. If v accepts c , we deduct c from the budget
and stop. Otherwise, if v turns down c , we simply move to the
next coupon inψ , the budget of the next round remains unchanged.
This process iterates until either v accepts the current coupon or
v rejects the entire ψ .
Let Cl = {c ∈ C|c ≤ B/2} be the low-value coupons in C. The
input of ALG I is Cl , restricting ourselves to use low-value coupons
only. Notice that there is no point offering a larger coupon to a user
before offering her a smaller coupon. Therefore, we sort Cl in non-
decreasing order of their values, e.g., ∀i ≤ j, ci ≤ cj . Define
Ψ , {ψ |ψ ≺ Cl , |ψ | ≤ K },
where ψ ≺ Cl represents thatψ is a subsequence of Cl . Since K is
a constant, the size of Ψ is polynomial in the size of Cl . We next
define the action space S under P.B:
S , V × Ψ
Picking an action (v,ψ ) ∈ S translates to probing user v using
sequenceψ .
Now we are ready to describe ALG I. The general idea is to first
find a fractional solution with a bounded approximation ratio and
then round it to an integral solution.
We present P.B-r, a relaxed version of P.B, as follows.
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P.B-r: Maximize f +(y)
subject to: 
∀v ∈ V :
∑
ψ ∈Ψ yvψ ≤ 1 (C1.1)∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψ bvψ ≤ B (C2.1)
∀(v, ψ ) ∈ S : yvψ ∈ [0, 1] (C3.1)
In the above formulation,
• y is a |V| × |Ψ| decision matrix.
• f +(y) is a concave extension of f :
max

∑
(v,ψ )∈S
α(v,ψ ) f ((v,ψ ))

α(v,ψ ) ≥ 0;∑
(v,ψ )∈S α(v,ψ ) ≤ 1;
∀v :
∑
(v,ψ )∋[vψ ] α(v,ψ ) ≤ yvψ

(1)
• bvψ is the expected cost of action (v,ψ ):
bvψ =
∑
c ∈ψ
(
∏
c ′:c ′≤c
(1 − pu,c ′)pv,cc)
Algorithm 1 Continuous Greedy
1: Set δ = 1/( |V | × |Ψ |)2, t = 0, f (∅) = 0.
2: while t < 1 do
3: Let R(t ) be a random set which contains each (v, ψ ) independent
with probability yvψ (t ).
4: For each (v, ψ ) ∈ S, estimate
ωvψ = E[f (R(t ) ∪ {(v, ψ )})] − E[[f (R(t ))]
5: Solve the following liner programming problem and obtain the op-
timal solution y∗
6: P.C: Maximize
∑
[vψ ]∈S ωvψ yvψ
subject to: {
(C1.1) and (C3.1)∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψ bvψ ≤ βB
7: Let y
д
vψ
(t + δ ) = y
д
vψ
(t ) + δy∗
vψ
;
8: Increment t = t + δ ;
We use the continuous greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) to solve
P.B-r and obtain an fractional solution yд . This algorithm is first
proposed in [13] in the context of offline submodular functionmax-
imization. Notice that condition (2.1) is replaced by
∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψbvψ ≤
βB in P.C, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/2 is a tuning parameter, e.g., the bud-
get K is scaled down by a factor of β .
Given yд , we next introduce the design of ALG I.
Step 1: Let R be a random set obtained by including each element
(v,ψ ) independently with probability y
д
vψ
.
Step 2: Apply Contention resolution [12] to R to obtain a new
setZ such that |Z ∩ Sv | ≤ 1 where Sv contains all actions from
S that involves v .
Step 3: Consider actions fromZ one by one in an arbitrary order,
let the current action, say (v,ψ ), survive if the current budget is no
smaller than B/2, else we discard it.
• If (v,ψ ) survives, probe v using ψ .
– If v rejects the entire ψ , repeat Step 3 with the same bud-
get,
– Otherwise, ifv accepts some coupon c ∈ ψ , deduct c from
the current budget and repeat Step 3.
• If (v,ψ ) is discarded, repeat Step 3 with the same budget.
Step 4: We add all survived actions to T1.
Let y+ be the optimal solution to P.B-r, we next prove that
ALG I is feasible and its expected cascade E[f (T1)] is close to
f +(y+).
Lemma 4.1. ALG I is feasible and
E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)(1 − 2β)β f
+(y+)
Proof. We first prove the feasibility of ALG I. First of all, we
always choose some action from Z to probe, thus every user re-
ceives at most K coupons (outer constraint is satisfied). In Step 3,
we probe a user if and only if the current budget is no smaller than
B/2, the inner constraint is also satisfied since we only consider
low-value coupons.
Fix some (v,ψ ) ∈ S. After Step 2, (v,ψ ) survives with proba-
bility (1 − β)y
д
vψ
. Now we consider the survival rate of (v,ψ ) af-
ter the Step 3. Let e1 denote the event that the total value of the
coupons redeemed by V \ {v} is no larger than B/2. Since every
coupon in ψ has value no larger than B/2, (v,ψ ) will be probed if
e1 happens. Because the expected cost of our solution is bounded
by
∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψbvψ ≤ βB, then according to Markov’s inequal-
ity, the probability of e1 is bounded by Pr[e1] ≥ 1 − 2β . It follows
that
E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − β)(1 − 2β)f (y
д)
≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)(1 − 2β)β f +(y+)
The first inequality is proved in [12] and the second inequality is
due to f (yд) ≥ (1 − 1/e)β f +(y+) which is proved in [3]. 
4.2 ALG II
In ALG II, we only use the largest coupon cmax = argmaxc ∈C c .
Given that we can only use one type of coupon, the coupon prob-
ing problem is reduced to determining the best order of users in
which to probe them. To avoid trivial cases, we assume cmax > B/2,
otherwise ALG I already achieves a constant approximation ratio.
The design of ALG II follows a simple greedy manner. We sort
all users in non-increasing order of I ({v}), then probe them one
by one using cmax. This process terminates when the current user
accepts cmax or the last user rejects cmax. Let Uv denote all users
placed before v , we have
Lemma 4.2. ALG II is the optimal policy if we are only allowed
to use the largest coupon cmax, and the expected utility of ALG II is∑
v ∈V (
∏
u :u ∈Uv (1 − pu,cmax)pv,cmaxI (v)).
4.3 Put It All Together
We randomly choose one algorithm from ALG I and ALG II with
equal probability as our solution. We refer to this algorithm as Sto-
chastic Coupon Probing policy (stoch-CP). The rest of this paper
is devoted to proving Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.3. Given any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/2, stoch-CP achieves
(1 − 1/e)(1 − β)(1 − 2β)β
2
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approximation ratio.
Proof. Let P.Al be a low-value version of P.A, restricting our-
selves to using low-value coupons Cl only. Let π
∗ be the optimal
solution to P.A. We next show by construction that there exists a
policy π ⋄ that is feasible to P.Al and its performance is close to
π∗ . Given π∗ , we next explain how to build π ⋄ on π∗ . Note that
our purpose is not to really construct such π ⋄ (this turns out to
be impossible since π∗ is not known in advance), instead, we only
want to prove the existence of such a policy.
Let Φt be the set of realizations available at round t (starting
with Φ0 = ∅). Assume π∗ is known and π∗(Φt ) = (v∗, c∗), e.g., π∗
picks (v∗, c∗) as the next action conditioned on Φt , the new policy
π ⋄(Φt ) is defined as follows:
π ⋄(Φt ) =
{
(v∗, c∗) if c∗ ≤ B/2
∅ otherwise
After observing the realization of ϕ(π ⋄(Φt )), we update the re-
alizations from Φt to Φt+1 as follows:
• Case A: If c∗ ≤ B/2, add ϕ((v∗, c∗)) to Φt : Φt+1 = Φt ∪
ϕ((v∗, c∗)).
• Case B: If c∗ > B/2, then π ⋄ is not allowed to use c∗, thus
it is impossible to observe the value of ϕ((v∗, c∗)). To over-
come this difficulty, we guess the value of ϕ((v∗, c∗)) using
simulation as follows:
Assume c < 1/2 is the largest low-value coupon offered to
v∗ by π ⋄ so far, randomly select a threshold σv ∈ (pv∗,c , 1].
This value is fixed once it has been selected and it will be
used as v∗’s threshold in the subsequent rounds.
– If pv∗,c∗ ≥ σv , add ϕ((v∗, c∗)) = 1 to Φt+1 virtually
– If pv∗,c∗ < σv , we add ϕ((v∗, c∗)) = 0 to Φt+1 virtually.
We use Φf to denote the realizations obtained at the final round.
We define UΦf to be the seed set under Φf . Note that π
⋄ mimics
the execution of π∗ , thus
E[I (UΦf )|π
⋄] = f (π∗) (2)
However, I (UΦf ) is not the actual set of seeds obtained by π
⋄, this
is because under Case B, we may virtually add some ϕ((v ′, c ′)) = 1
with c ′ > B/2 toΦf . Fortunately, we add at most one such action to
Φf , otherwise it violates the budget constraint. It follows that the
actual seed set obtained by π ⋄ isUΦf \ {v
′} if such v ′ exists, thus
the expected utility of π ⋄ is f (π ⋄) = E[I (UΦf \ {v
′})|π∗]. Then we
have
f (π ⋄) = E[I (UΦf )|π
∗] − E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗], (3)
where ∆UΦf
(v ′) = UΦf −UΦf \{v
′} is marginal utility ofv ′ given
existing seed setUΦf \ {v
′}.
Equations (2) and (3) imply that
f (π∗) = f (π ⋄) + E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗] (4)
To prove Theorem 4.3, it is sufficient to show that E[f (T1)] ≥
(1−1/e)(1−β)(1−2β)β f (π ⋄) (Lemma 4.4) and E[f (T2)] ≥ E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗]
(Lemma 4.5).
Lemma 4.4. E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)(1 − 2β)β f (π ⋄).
Proof. Let π∗
l
be the optimal solution to P.Al . Fix somev ∈ V .
Consider a realization ϕv that involves V \ {v}, we define d as
the longest possible sequence of coupons offered to v by π∗ (not
necessarily to be in consecutive rounds) given ϕv , e.g., this can
only happen when the entire d is rejected by v . It is important to
note that when π∗ and ϕv are given, d is also fixed, and we call d
the probing sequence picked by π∗
l
under ϕv . Let Φ
d
v
denote the set
of all realizations that involvesV\{v} under which d is offered to
v by π∗. For every [vψ ] ∈ S, we define y∗
vψ
as the probability that
d is offered to v by π∗
l
, e.g., y∗
vψ
=
∑
ϕv ∈Φ
d
v
Pr[ϕv ]. We first prove
that y∗
l
is a feasible solution to P.B. Because π∗
l
is a feasible policy,
the following conditions are satisfied in each round
(1) Every user is probed using at most K coupons.
(2) The total value of redeemed coupons under π∗
l
is no larger
than B. Because
∑
[vψ ]∈S y
∗
vψ
bvψ is the expected cost of π
∗
l
,
we have
∑
[vψ ]∈S y
∗
vψ
bvψ ≤ B.
The above two properties ensure that y∗
l
is a feasible solution to
P.B-r. Since y+ is the optimal solution to P.B-r, we have f +(y+) ≥
f +(y∗
l
) ≥ f (π∗
l
). Because π∗
l
is the optimal solution to P.Al , we
have f (π∗
l
) ≥ f (π ⋄). It follows that f +(y+) ≥ f (π ⋄). Then we
have
E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − 2β)β f
+(y+)
≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − 2β)β f (π ⋄)
The first inequality is due to Lemma 4.1 and the second inequality
is due to f +(y+) ≥ f (π ⋄). 
Lemma 4.5. E[f (T2)] ≥ E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗].
Proof. Because f is submodular, we have E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗] ≤
E[I ({v ′})|π∗]. According to ALG II,T2 contains a single active user
which gives the largest expected influence, thenwe have E[f (T2)] ≥
E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗]. 
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
5 EXTENSION: INCORPORATING COUPON
DISTRIBUTION BUDGET
We now study P.A1, an extension of P.A, by adding one more con-
straint to P.A: the number of users that are probed can not ex-
ceed an non-negative numberW . This constraint captures the fact
that the company often has limited budgeted on coupon producing
and distribution, thus we can offer coupons to a limited number of
users. We next summarize the updated constraints as follows.
• Outer Constraints: The number of probes involving the same
user can not exceed a non-negative number K and the num-
ber of users probed can not exceed an non-negative number
W .
• Inner Constraints: The total value of redeemed coupons can
not exceed a non-negative number B.
5.1 Extended ALG I
We present P.B-r1, an extended version of P.B-r, as follows. Con-
dition (C4.1) specifies the additional outer constraint.
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P.B-r1: Maximize f +(y)
subject to: 
∀v ∈ V :
∑
d∈Ψ yvψ ≤ 1 (C1.1)∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψ bvψ ≤ B (C2.1)
∀(v, ψ ) ∈ S : yvψ ∈ [0, 1] (C3.1)∑
v∈V,ψ ∈Ψ yvψ ≤W (C4.1)
Similar to ALG I, the basic idea of Extended ALG I (E-ALG I) is
still to use the continuous greedy algorithm to obtain a fractional
solution first, then round it to an integer solution. The continuous
greedy algorithm is basically the same as Algorithm 1, except in
that P.C is replaced by P.C1.
P.C1: Maximize
∑
[vψ ]∈S ωvψ yvψ
subject to: 
(C1.1) and (C3.1)∑
(v,ψ )∈S yvψ bvψ ≤ βB∑
v∈V,ψ ∈Ψ yvψ ≤ βW
Let yд be the solution returned from the continuous greedy al-
gorithm, we next round yд to an integer solution. Our rounding
approach is the same as the one used in ALG I except in that Step
2.0 is replaced by the following procedure.
Modified Step 2: Apply Contention resolution [12] for two ma-
troids to R to obtain a new set Z such that |Z ∩ Sv | ≤ 1 and
|Z| ≤W .
LetT2 be the set of survived actions, we next prove that E-ALG I
is feasible and its expected cascade E[f (T2)] is close to the optimal
solution.
Lemma 5.1. E-ALG I is feasible and
E[f (T2)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)
2(1 − 2β)β f +(y+)
Proof. We first prove the feasibility of E-ALG I. First of all, be-
cause |Z∩Sv | ≤ 1 and |Z| ≤W ,Z satisfies the outer constraints.
In Step 3, we probe a group of users subject to budget constraint,
thus inner constraint is also satisfied.
Fix some (v,ψ ) ∈ V×Ψ. After Step 2, (v,ψ ) survives with proba-
bility (1−β)2y
д
vψ
. Similar to Lemma 4.1, we can prove that the sur-
vival rate of (v,ψ ) after Step 3 is 1−2β . Moreover, the above round-
ing process is equivalent to performing three independent round-
ing subject to two outer constraints and one inner constraints re-
spectively, and returning the intersection of the three sets. Then
according to [12], we have E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − β)2(1 − 2β)β f (yд). It
follows that E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)2(1 − 2β)β f +(y+). 
5.2 Extended ALG II
Similar toALG II, we only use cmax in Extended ALG II (E-ALG II).
However, instead of using a simple greedy algorithm to find the
optimal solution, we turn to dynamic programming to handle the
additional constraint (C4.1). Notice that since we can only probeW
users, our problem becomes a joint user selection and sequencing
problem, e.g., select a set ofW users and decide in what order to
probe them using cmax.
Assume all users are sorted in non-decreasing order of I ({v}).
In the following recurrence, f [vi , l] stores the optimum expected
utility that can be obtained from users vi , · · · ,vn subject to the
constraint that we can only probe l users. Essentially, we need to
decide whether to probe vi or not in each step. The optimal value
gained from adding vi to the solution can be calculated as
I ({vi })pvi,cmax + (1 − pvi,cmax )f [i − 1, l − 1]
Otherwise, the optimal value is f [i − 1, l]. Thus we adopt the fol-
lowing recurrence to obtain a sequence of users f [n,W ]:
f [i, l] = max{I ({vi })pvi,cmax+(1−pvi,cmax))f [i−1, t−1], f [ai−1, l]}
Then we probe f [vn ,W ] one by one in non-increasing order of
I ({v}) until some user accepts cmax or none of them accepts cmax.
Let T2 denote the set of seeds returned from E-ALG II.
5.3 Put It All Together
We randomly choose one algorithm from E-ALG I and E-ALG II
with equal probability as our solution. We refer to this algorithm
as Extended Stochastic Coupon Probing policy (E-stoch-CP). The
rest of this paper is devoted to proving Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2. Given any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/2, E-stoch-CP achieves
(1 − 1/e)(1 − β)2(1 − 2β)β
2
approximation ratio.
Proof. Let E-P.Al be a low-value version of E-P.A, restricting
ourselves to using low-value coupons Cl only. Let π
∗ be the opti-
mal solution to E-P.A. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we can
show that there exists a policy π ⋄ that is feasible to E-P.Al and
f (π∗) = f (π ⋄) + E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗] (5)
To prove Theorem 5.2, it is sufficient to prove the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. E[f (T1)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)(1 − β)2(1 − 2β)β f (π ⋄)
The proof of Lemma 5.3 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.4,
thus omitted here.
Lemma 5.4. E[f (T2)] ≥ E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗].
Proof. Since v ′ denotes the user (if any) who accepts some
coupon larger than B/2 and we can add at most one such user
to the optimal solution, one can obtain a valid upper bound of
E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗], e.g., the marginal contribution of v ′ to the opti-
mal policy, by computing f (πh ) where πh is the optimal solution
when restricting ourselves to using high-value coupons C \ Cl .
It was worth noticing that those users who accept a low-value
coupon under π∗ will not contribute to E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗]. However,
if a user, say v , rejects all low-value coupons offered by π∗ , we
need to update the distribution of σv as follows: assume cˆ is the
largest low-value coupon rejected byv , then the conditional value
of σv is to be randomly selected from (pv, cˆ , 1]. Under either of
the previous two cases, the conditional value of E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗]
is only decreased. This observation indicates that f (πh ) is still a
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valid upper bound of E[∆UΦf
(v ′)|π∗], conditioned on some low-
value coupons have been offered to the users.
Next we prove that E[f (T2)] ≥ E(πh ). We first prove that there
exists a πh that probes the same user in consecutive rounds. Con-
sider a relaxed problem where the set of usersW probed by πh is
known, it is optimal to probeW in non-increasing order of I ({v}).
This is because if there exists two usersu,v ∈ W : I ({v}) < I ({u})
and v is probed first, we lose the chance to probeu ifv accepts the
coupon, thus probingu first leads to a larger expected utility. There-
fore, it is optimal to probe the same user in consecutive rounds. It
follows that the expected utility of πh is
EW∼πh [
∑
v ∈W
∏
u ∈Wv
(1 − pu,chu
)pv,chv
I ({v})],
where Wv denotes the set of users that are probed before v ,
e.g., ∀u ∈ Wv : I ({u}) ≤ I ({v}), and chv denotes the largest
coupon offered to v by πh . Consider a fixed W, we next show
that
∑
v ∈W
∏
u ∈Uv (1−pu,chu
)pv,chv
I ({v}) is a increasing function
of pz,chz
for any z ∈ W (assuming pu,chu
is fixed for all other
u ∈ U\{z}). This is because
∑
v ∈W
∏
u ∈Wv (1−pu,chu )pv,chv I ({v})
can be rewritten as
∑
v∈Wz
∏
u∈Uv
(1 − p
u,chu
)p
v,chv
I ({v })
+
∏
u∈Uz
(1 − p
u,chu
)(p
v,chz
θ1 + (1 − pz,chz
)θ2) (6)
In the above equation, θ1 is the expected utility conditioned on
z is probed and accepts the coupon and θ2 is the expected utility
conditioned on z is probed and rejects the coupon. Since the first
term of Eq. (6) does not contain pz,chz
, we next focus on proving
that the second term of Eq. (6) is a increasing function of pz,chz
.
Becauseθ1 = I ({z})and all users probed after z has expected utility
no larger than I ({z}), we have θ1 ≥ θ2. It follows that the second
term of Eq. (6) is an increasing function of pz,chz
, thus∑
v ∈W
∏
u ∈Wv
(1 − pu,chu
)pv,chv
I ({v})
is an increasing function of pz,chz
. Therefore, offering cmax to each
user will never decrease the expected utility. Since f (T2) is the opti-
mal solutionwhen using cmax only, we have E[f (T2)] ≥ E(πh ). 
This finishes the proof of Theorem 5.2. 
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we study stochastic couponprobing problem in social
networks. Different from existing work on discount allocation, we
formulate our problem as a stochastic optimization problem. Our
ultimate goal is to develop an efficient probing policy subject to
inner and outer constraints. We notice that existing stochastic op-
timization approaches can not apply to our setting directly. Our
main result is a constant approximation policy for the stochastic
coupon probing problem, and we believe that this result made fun-
damental contributions to the field of stochastic optimization.
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